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FOREWORD 
The project "Social Security, Family and Household in Aging Societies", conducted in 
collaboration with the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), has 
resulted so far in several cross-national comparisons involving twelve participating coun- 
tries. In addition to the comparative studies, twelve individual country reports are being 
produced. The country study for Austria was produced at IIASA by Dr. Gonnot, who is 
also the coordinator of the international project. The other country studies will either a p  
pear as IIASA working papers or as papers of the respective national institutions. It is 
also planned to combine all studies into one volume. 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Deputy Leader 
Population Program 
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ABSTRACT 
The aging of the Austrian population will reach, in the first half of the next century, a 
level which implies a dramatic deterioration of the performance of the State pension aye- 
tem. Parallel to  aging, substantial changes in the marital composition of the elderly popu- 
lation and strong improvements in benefit entitlements for women will be observed. 
Different solutions to  the pension problem are tested and compared. 
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SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND 
THE PENSION PROBLEM IN AUSTRIA 
Jean-Pierre Gonnot 
1. Basic Demographic  Trends in the P o s t w a r  Per iod  
Since the end of the Second World War, demographic developments in Austria have 
followed a pattern which ie similar to the one observed in many developed countries: a 
baby boom and a marriage boom followed by a baby bust and a marriage bust, increased 
divorce and survivorship. 
With respect to fertility, three periods can be distinguished. From the end of the war 
to  1963, the secular downward trend was interrupted by the baby boom: the total fertility 
rate (TFR) rose from 2.00 in 1951 to  a maximum of 2.82 in 1963 (see Figure 1). After 
1964 fertility dropped, the TFR reaching 1.69 in 1976. Since this date, a much smoother 
decrease, accompanied by fluctuations, has been observed - the TFR was 1.44 in 1988 - 
which suggests that fertility might be in a process of stabilization.' This last period is also 
characterized by a strong increase in the proportion of births out of wedlock which has al- 
ways been relatively high: from 13.5% in 1975 to  23.4% in 1987, but again with indica- 
tion of levelling in the most recent years (see Figure 2). 
A main feature of nuptiality since 1950 has been the scissors effect between intensity 
and age at  marriage. The proportion ever-marrying increased in the 1950s - from 90.4% 
and 88.1% in 1951 for males and females respectively, to  93.0% and 93.9% in 1961; i t  
remained a t  a high level till the early 1970s and steadily decreased afterwards - 74.6% for 
males and 77.8% for females in 1985 (see Table l).' Between 1970 and 1980, first mar- 
riage rates dropped by 50% under age 20, by 30% between 20 and 25, and by 25% 
between 25 and 30. The mean age at  first marriage decreased till the early 1970s - mini- 
ma were observed in 1974/1975 for both males and females with 25.6 and 22.8 years, 
respectively - and started strongly increasing after 1980 - 26.9 and 24.7 years in 1988 (see 
Figure 3). Nevertheless, both figures are still far from values which prevailed between the 
wars - less than two-thirds marrying and age a t  marriage around 30. Legal marriage is 
still the dominant type of union, but consensual union is favored among the very young: 
in 1985, 73.2% of unions whose partners were aged 15 to  19 were consensual unions, 
10.4% among the 20-24, and only 4.5% among the 25-29. 
Similar changes can also be noted with regard to  the remarriage of divorcees which 
increased during the 1950s and subsequently fell: 80% of divorced males and 65.1% of di- 
vorced females remarried in 1951 versus 60.6% and 44.6% in 1985. Still many more di- 
vorced males than females remarry. On the other hand, remarriage of widowed has con- 
stantly decreased and has now almost disappeared among women: 19.6% of widowers and 
4.9% of widows remarried in 1951 while corresponding figures for 1985 are 7.4% and 1.4%. 
'A TFR of 1.54 wao ured for calculations which correrpondr to the weighted average for the period 1981-85. 
'~arital-rtatur life-table rtatirtics, baaed on cenrur data for 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981 and on a reconrtruc- 
tion of the population for 1985. 
Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate 
Figure 2. Illegitimacy Ratio 
l l e g t l m a t e  t ~ r t h s  per ?00 h ~ r t h s  
Table 1. Nuptiality and mortality, 1951-1985. 
1951 1961 1971 1981 1985 1951 1961 1971 1981 1985 
Females Males 
A. ~ u ~ t i a l i t ~ ~ )  
Proportion ever-marrying 
Mean age at first marriage 
Proportion marriage ending 
in divorce 
Proportion divorced remarrying 
Proportion widowed remarrying 
Average length of widowhood 
married aged 60 
B. Mortality 
Life expectancy (years) 
at birth 
at age 60 
at age 80 
Survivors (per 1000 born) 
at age 60 
at age 80 
a) Marital-status lifotable statistics except mean age at first marriage. AlI proportions per 100. 
Figure 3. Mean age at first marriage 
moles  + fema les  
In the early 1950s, divorce was especially high in Austria due to the specific postwar 
context - about 19% of the marriages contracted in 1951 would have ended in divorce if 
current divorce conditions had prevailed during the whole life. Afterwards, it slightly de- 
creased - around 16% of the marriages would have ended in divorce in 1961 - and then in- 
creased - around 24% of divorces in 1985. The trend still seems to be either somewhat 
upward or on the way to stabilization. 
Between 1951 and 1985, life expectancy at birth increased by 9.6 years for women 
(from 67.8 to 77.4) and by 8.0 years for men (from 62.4 to 70.4 years). However, during 
this period, mortality changes were not regular. A strong improvement is indicated in the 
1950s - plus 5.0 and 3.9 years respectively for women and men - followed in the 1960% by 
limited change for women - plus 0.9 year - and a stagnation for men. The 1960s also con- 
trast with the subsequent period: since the beginning of the 1970s, mortality has steadily 
fallen - plus 2.7 years between 1971 and 1981 for both males and females. Since 1984, the 
increase in life expectancy has strongly accelerated, each year bringing a new rise of 
0.3/0.5 years with a small additional bonus for males. As a consequence, the sex gap has 
started to slightly decline from a maximum of 7.1 to 6.6 years in 1988. During the 1950s 
the increase in the sex gap was mostly due to the stagnation of the male mortality at old- 
er age, while in the 1960s eex differentials in mortality at adult age played a major role. 
In 1985, about 90% of the women survived till age 60, and more than half till age 80 
versus 80% and 30% of men, respectively. Except for infant mortality, male mortality in 
1985 is thus very close to female mortality 35 years ago. This has important conse- 
quences for the last phase of the life-cycle. On average, women live 21 years beyond age 
60, of which 9 years are spent by married women as widowed while figures for men are 
respectively 17 years and 2 years. 
Extrapolation of most recent trends consider as most probable a stabilization of both 
fertility, marriage and divorce at  their present level.3 On the contrary, the future of mor- 
tality is very uncertain both in the short and long run. A decrease of 30% in age-specific 
mortality rates for females and of 37% for males was assumed in the national scenario, 
reducing the sex gap by about one-fifth, with life expectancy reaching 81.7 and 76.1 
respectively for women and men in 2005 versus 78.7 for men under the mortality scenario. 
In addition, it also assumed an annual net migration of 15,000 persons, 51.6% males aged 
20.2 years on average, 51.6% females aged 27.9 on average, and having the same marital 
characteristics as the Austrian population. 
2. Changes in the Sice and Age Structure of the Population 
Since the mid-19708, the population growth in Austria has been close to  zero with 
frequent birth deficits. In the future, no positive growth is to be expected in the absence 
of a substantial and constant inflow of migrants as illustrated by the figures in Table 2.4 
Under constant demographic conditions, the decrease of the population would first be lim- 
ited between 1985 and 2000 from 7.566 million inhabitants to 7.452 million, but would 
strongly accelerate beyond this date to  7.004 million in 2015, 6.321 million in 2030, and 
5.103 million in 2050. A similar pattern of change would be observed under any scenario 
which excludes international migration. Figures for the western scenario are very close to  
the benchmark scenario, except in 2050 (4.833 million), and both scenarios indicate the 
strongest decrease. If fertility would progressively return to replacement level by the year 
2005, population will still decrease, but to a much lower extent: 7.252 million in 2015, 
7.252 in 2030 and finally 6.884 in 2050. The decrease will also be more limited under the 
mortality scenario: 7.434 million in 2015, 6.940 in 2030 and 5.795 in 2050. On the other 
hand, under the assumptions included in the national specific scenario, and especially a 
net annual inflow of 15,000 migrants, the Austrian population would rise to 7.907 million 
in 2015, but would still experience a decrease afterwards to  respectively 7.733 and 7.086 
million in 2030 and 2050. 
These figures show that the possible range of change in the size of the total popula- 
tion is fairly wide: the difference between the national and the western scenarios is 1.4 
million in 2030 and 2.2 million in 2050. Substantial differences are also indicated regard- 
ing variations in the absolute and relative sizes of the three main age groups which com- 
pose the population: the young, the working-age population and the elderly. The number 
of younger people will decrease unless fertility returns to  replacement level, and then it  
will remain approximatively constant. Under constant fertility conditions, the population 
under age 15 will steadily decrease from 1.378 million in 1985 to  879,000 in 2030 and 
690,000 in 2050. A further fall in fertility to the lowest level observed in West Germany - 
1.28 children per woman - would bring an additional decrease in the young age popula- 
tion of about 200,000: 692,000 in 2030 and 474,000 in 2050. On the contrary, migration 
as assumed in the national scenario would result in a more limited fall in the population 
under 15: 1.096 million in 2030 and 995,000 in 2050. 
3 ~ n  the national wenario, it was wumed that although fertility might rtill rlightly decrease in the rhort 
term as a ranlt of the increaae in the mean age at Imt marriage - nuptiality, divorce and illegitimacy 
remaining approximately conrtant - fertility will return to a level of 1.61 in the long term. 
' ~ t  ir recalled that the benchmark wenario wumes  that demographic variables remain conrtant at their 
prwnt  level; the fertility uenario aaaumes that fertility return8 to replacement level; the mortality wenario 
w u m a  that age rpccific mortality rates are decreased by 30% for women and 45% for men; and the western 
low lcenario w u m a  West German fertility, Swedish marriage and divorce, and Swiss mortality. All 
changer occur gradually between 1985 and 2000. 
Table 2. Population by broad age groups, 1950-2050. 
Absolute (1000s) Relative (%) 
1 4  15-59 60+ Total 0-14 15-59 60+ Totd 
Benchmark Scenario 
Fertility Scenario 
Mortality Scenario 
Western Scenario 
National 1 Scenario 
Parallel to the decline of the young age population, the working-age population will 
also certainly decrease in the long term. Till 2000, very little change is to be expected in 
the absence of migration. Under the assumption of an annual net migration flow of 
15,000 individuals - national scenario - the working-age population would increase from 
4.680 to 4.816 million. Between 2000 and 2015, it decreases by 311,000 under the bench- 
mark scenario, 214,000 under the fertility scenario, 264,000 under the mortality scenario - 
which shows that the potential for saving years of life during adulthood is still substantial 
in Austria, especially for males - 331,000 under the western scenario and only 91,000 
under the national scenario. Between 2015 and 2030, the fall is much more dramatic, 
ranging from 477,000 to 968,000 respectively under the fertility and western scenarios. 
Beyond this date, the working-age population would stabilize under the fertility scenario 
and continue t o  strongly decrease under other scenarios. Consequently, the size of the 
working-age population would be inferior to the value observed in 1985 by 15% to  30% in 
2030 and by 15% to 50% in 2050. 
The elderly population will steadily grow till around 2030 and then drop. In 2030, 
the population aged 60 and over would reach 1.940 million under constant mortality con- 
ditions (+ 28.6%), 2.475 under the low mortality scenario (+ 64.1%), and 2.455 million 
under the national scenario compared with 1.508 million in 1985. In 2050, the correspond- 
ing figures would be 1.579 million, 2.180 million and 2.294 million. 
These trends have major consequences regarding the age structure of the population. 
The share of the young people in the total population will decrease unless fertility returns 
to replacement level: from 18.2% in 1985, i t  would change to between 10% to 14% in 
2030/2050. Under the fertility scenario, it would remain constant and slightly increase 
beyond 2030 to 19.8%. The share of the working-age population will also decrease after a 
small rise during the period 1985-2000, especially between 2015 and 2030. In 2030, i t  
would represent between 51.5% and 55.4% of the total population and between 50.2% and 
57.2% - an increase of 2.8 percentage points is observed under the fertility scenario - in 
2050 versus 61.9% in 1985. On the contrary, the share of the elderly population will shar- 
ply rise with most of the rise occurring between 2015 and 2030; starting from 19.9% in 
1985, it would reach 26.8% in 2030 under the fertility scenario, 30.7% under the bench- 
mark scenario, 31.7% under the national scenario, 35.7% under the low mortality scenario 
and 36% under the western scenario. Beyond 2030, i t  will decrease to 22.9% under the 
fertility scenario, remain approximatively constant under the benchmark scenario, and 
respectively increase to 32.4%, 37.6% and 40.0% under the national, mortality and 
western scenarios. 
Therefore, under any scenario, the Austrian population will experience a substantial 
aging. This is also reflected by changes in the old-age dependency ratio (OADR) (see 
Table 3 and Figure 4). In 1985, there were 21.2 persons in the age group 65 and over per 
100 population of working-age. In 2000, the ratio will not be very different: between 22.8 
and 24.0. In 2015, the increase is still limited under the fertility and benchmark scenarios 
- respectively 25.4 and 26.0 - but more marked under the national scenario - 29.7 -, the 
western scenario - 30.5 - and the low mortality scenario - 32.0. The period 2015-2030 
will definitely be that of maximum aging in Austria, the old-age dependency ratio reach- 
ing values of 35.6 under constant demographic conditions, 32.0 if fertility increases to  2.1, 
39.6 under the national scenario, 44.7 under the western scenario and 46.1 if the low mor- 
tality would materialize. Figures for 2050 show that beyond 2030, aging will slow down 
especially under the benchmark and national scenarios to 37.6 and 43.0. Maximum 
OADR are observed under the western and mortality scenarios, 54.8 and 52.6, respective- 
ly. A slight "rejuvenation" would even be possible under the fertility scenario, 27.8. It 
is interesting to  note that migration as assumed under the national scenario slightly adds 
to the aging of the population: in 2000 the OADR is 23.3 versus 22.6 if migration is ex- 
cluded, and in 2030 figures are respectively 39.6 and 35.7. Aa indicated by changes in the 
total dependency ratio (TDR), the aging of the population will also be accompanied by an 
increase in the total number of persons in dependent ages per 100 in working ages: TDR 
Table 3. Dependency ratios, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 
Under 15 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
65 and Over 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Total 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Figure 4. Old-Age Dependency Ratio 
Benchmark + Fertility 0 Mortality A National I 
between 59.1 under the benchmark scenario to 73.7 under the mortality scenario in 2050 
versus 48.1 observed in 1985. 
3. Changes in the Marital Composition of the Elderly Population 
The marital structure of the elderly population in Austria bears the imprint of a 
severe sex imbalance which mostly results from war losses. In 1985 there were only 56.9 
men aged 60 and over per 100 women (see Table 4). Consequently, only 34.7% of the eld- 
erly women were married versus 77.4% of the men, and almost half (49.2%) were widowed 
versus 13.4% of men (aee Table 5). The proportion single is much higher among old fe- 
males - 11.0% - than among old males - 5.8% - reflecting the traditional male over- 
nuptiality. Slightly more old females than old males are divorced - 5.1% versus 3.4% - 
which is explained by higher remarriage among divorced males. 
Table 4. Masculinity ratio for the population aged 60 and over..) 
Scenario 
Benchmark Mortality Western National 1 
a) Number of men per 100 women. 
In the future, the sex imbalance will be progressively reduced to a level correspond- 
ing to the sex differentials in survivorship. Under present mortality conditions, this sta- 
tionary masculinity ratio is about 72/75 and will be reached around 2010. Under the 
mortality scenario, which assumes that the sex gap in mortality will be reduced by half, 
the masculinity ratio would increase to 90.2 in 2050 and under the national scenario - sex 
gap approximatively reduced by one-fifth - to 82.1. However, it is difficult to estimate 
the impact of the improvement in the sex structure of the elderly population because the 
future living arrangements of the elderly also reflect the substantial changes in nuptiality 
which occurred in the recent past. 
The proportion single at older age is mostly influenced by the nuptiality behavior at 
young a d u l t h d .  Therefore, little uncertainty exists with respect to the future, even in 
the long term (see Figures 5a and 5b). Till 2015, males and females show reverse trends: 
the proportion single among females indicates a small decrease to 8.3%, while among 
males it will increase to 9.5110%. Aa a consequence, starting in 2010, more - very few 
more in fact - old males than females will be single, which is a reversal in a secular trend. 
Between 2015 and 2030, a sharp rise in the proportion single is observed for both males 
and females to respectively about 15116% - 18% under the western scenario - and 13%. 
Beyond 2030, the increase will be limited, around 16118% for both sexes in 2050, except 
under the western scenario - 31.1% single among old males and 23.6% among old females 
in 2050. 
With constant marriage and divorce intensity, the percentage divorced in the elderly 
population will increase till 2015 and then stabilize a t  a level of 7% among males and 
about 11% among females (see Figures 6a and 6b). If the the Swedish pattern of marriage 
and divorce was progressively adopted, the proportion divorced would continue to in- 
Table 5. Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over, 1985-2050. 
Femalea 
Married Divorced 
Males 
Married Divorced Widowed Total Single Widowed Total Single 
Benchmark Scenario 
Weatern Scenario 
Mortality Scenario 
National 1 Scenario 
Percent,age L Single 
Figure 5a. 
among females 60 and over 
36 I 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
Figure 5b. Percentage Single 
among males  6 0  and over 
36 1P 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
Figure 6a. P e r c e n t a g e  Divorced 
among women 60 and over 
18 1 
D Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
Figure 6b. P e r c e n t a g e  Divorced 
among males 60 and over 
18 
17 - 
16 - 
15 - 
14 - 
13 - 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National -1 
crease between 2015 and 2030, reaching respectively 12.2% and 16.4% among old males 
and females, decrease among males beyond 2030 - 10.9% in 2050 - and level off among fe- 
males. 
Future trends in the proportion married and widowed in the elderly population carry 
over much more uncertainty than the percentage single or divorced as they both depend 
on nuptiality behavior at  adulthood and on mortality, especially sex difference in mortali- 
ty, at  older age. Nevertheless, in the case of Austria, trends are clear for both males and 
females. 
Little change is to be expected in the proportion of males widowed. Under constant 
mortality conditions, it would approximatively remain constant around 11113% (see also 
Figures 7a and 7b). A 50% reduction in the sex gap in mortality, as assumed under the 
low mortality scenario, would only increase the proportion by about 3 percentage points 
in 2050, and similar figures are indicated under the western scenario. Therefore, the in- 
crease in the proportion single and divorced among the male elderly will result in a sub- 
stantial decrease in the proportion married: between 60.5% and 62.5% in 2050 with con- 
stant nuptiality, and 42.8% with the Swedish nuptiality versus 77.4% in 1985 (see Figures 
8a and 8b). 
The proportion widowed among the female elderly population will steadily decrease 
till 2030 under any scenario. Beyond this date, a small increase of about 213 percentage 
points is observed except under the western scenario which shows a decrease of the same 
size. While in 1985 about half of the women aged 60 and over were widowed, they will be 
about 40% in 2030 under the benchmark scenario and about one-third under other 
scenarios. Regarding the proportion of old women married, little variation is observed 
under the benchmark scenario while other scenarios show a rise with a maximum in 2015: 
40.5% under the national scenario, 41.1% under the western scenario, and 44.5% under 
the mortality scenario versus 34.6% in 1985. Figures remain stable over the period 
2015-2030 and slightly decrease afterwards. Only the western scenario would lead to a 
lower value than in 1985, 28.5% in 2050. 
Thus, a main characteristic of future changes in the marital composition of the elder- 
ly population in Austria is the contrast between the fall in the proportion married among 
old males and the rise among females. All together, this leads to a small increase in the 
total population married till 2030 under the mortality and national scenarios, respectively 
53.8% and 52.6% versus 50.2% in 1985, followed by a slight decrease. Under the bench- 
mark and the western scenario, the decrease in the proportion married among old males 
more than offsets the increase among old females, and therefore the proportion married 
for both sex decreases, respectively 48.3% and 44.7% in 2030, and 44.5% and 34.6% in 
2050. 
Figure 7a. Percentage  Widowed 
among females 60 and over 
1 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
Figure 7b. Percen tage  Widowed 
among males 60 and over 
20 , 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
Figure 8a. Percentage  Married 
among males 60  and over 
80 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality a National 1 
Figure 8b. Percentage  Married 
among females 6 0  and over 
50 1 
Benchmark + Western 0 Mortality A National 1 
4. The Austrian State Pension System 
The Austrian state pension system encompasses three main schemes: the employees 
scheme, the self-employed scheme and the civil servants scheme (see Table 6). The em- 
ployees scheme includes funds for blue and white collar workers, and is by far the largest 
scheme. In 1985, it provided 72.3% of the total number of pensions and paid 68.6% of t e  
tal benefits. The scheme for self-employed both for farmers and non-farmers is the second 
scheme with respect to the number of pensions - 17.8% - but third for the amount of 
benefits served - 13.3% versus 18.2% for the civil servants scheme. On the basis of the ac- 
tual number of persons insured, it is expected that the share of the employees will grow to 
the detriment of the self-employed. The decreasing economic role of the self-employed is 
also reflected in the fact that the scheme for self-employed presently faces the leea favor- 
able demographic conditions according to the ratio between the number of pensions and 
the number of insured: 857 per thousand in 1985 versus 548 and 604 respectively for em- 
ployees and civil servants. 
Table 6. Characteristics of the different Austrian pension schemes, 1985. 
- - - - - -  - - 
Scheme 
Employees Self-Employed Civil Servants 
Number of pensions paid 
(1000s)~) 1302 (72.3%) 321 (17.8%) 178 (9.9%) 
Total benefits paid 
(millions of schillings)') 124411 (68.6%) 24102 (13.3%) 32967 (18.2%) 
Average annual old- ge 
benefits (schillings) d 104384 81004 185108 
Number of persons insured 
( 1 ~ 0 s ) ~ )  2374 (77.9) 374 (12.3) 295 (9.7) 
Ratio pensions/insureda) 
(per 1000) 548 
Contribution rate 22.7 13.0~) 8.0 
Full pension 79.5% for 45 years 79.5% for 45 years 80% for 34.5 years 
Income basis for 
calculating benefits last ten years last ten years last income 
Upper ceiling for 
contribution and benefits Yes Yes no 
a) Table 1, page 177 in A. Guger (1987) Umucricilun~ durch 6ffcntlichc Hawhdtc in Ocstcwcick Vienna: 
Austrian Institute for Economic b e a r c h  
b) 12.5 for farmem 
Both schemes differ in many respects. First, contribution varies from 8.0% of gross 
wages for civil servants - no employer's contribution from the State - to 12.5113% for 
self-employed and 22.7% for employees - 10.25% paid by the employee and 12.45% by the 
employer. Second, full pension requires 45 years of contribution for employees and self- 
employed but only 34.5 years for civil servants. At present, self-employed have a lower 
insurance record than other categories, and consequently lower benefits, because pension 
insurance only spread among self-employed after the Second World War. Third, the in- 
come basis for calculating the benefits is the last ten years for employees and self- 
employed while it is the last, and consequently the highest, salary for civil servants. 
Fourth, there is an upper ceiling for contribution and benefits for both employees and 
self-employed, but not for civil servants. As a consequence, returns, average benefits and 
conditions for financial equilibrium also differ between the three schemes. 
Benefits are automatically but not strictly indexed for wage increase. The adjust- 
ment is based on a specific wage index which excludes both high and low salaries and 
which is weighted according to change in the unemployment rate. 
Benefits are increased by 5% for each dependent child. Survivor benefits amount to 
60% of the old-age benefits of the deceaeed spouse, and disability benefits are strictly 
equal to old-age benefits. 
5. Retirement and Work Pat terns  
In Austria, eligible age for old-age pension is 60 for women and 65 for men, but 
under early retirement provisions women can retire at age 55 and men at age 60, and at 
any age if disable. In 1985, only 20% of the women and 6% of the men retired at pension- 
able age. Half of the male new retirees and 60% of the females go on retirement at eligi- 
ble age and during the subsequent year: 55/56 years for women, 60/61 for both sexes, and 
65/66 for men (see Figure 9). The rest of the new retirees is approximatively evenly dis- 
tributed between ages 50 and 67. On average, men retire one year later than women: 
59.8 years versus 58.9 years.5 Figure 10, which displays the cumulated distribution of the 
new retirees, illustrates the importance of early retirement practice in Austria: 50% of the 
women are already on retirement before pensionable age (60 years) and about 80% of men 
before age 65. 
Work record at mean age at retirement substantially varies between males and fe- 
males. In 1985, the average number of years worked at mean age at retirement was es- 
timated to 40.3 for men and 22.6 for women. However, in the future, the gap will be re- 
duced as  a result of recent changes in the sex and age pattern of economic activity. Since 
the early 1970%, female participation in the labor force shows a marked increase between 
ages 20 and 50 and only a slight decrease at older age (see Figure 11). On the contrary, 
activity rates for men have decreased at all ages and especially at 55 and 65. The impact 
of these changes on the future work record of both sexes is given in Table 7. Under the as- 
sumption of constant labor force participation rates, the average number of years worked 
would be progressively reduced to 36.6 years for men in 2050, namely a difference of 3.7 
years, or 9.2%. During the same period, it would rise for women by 5.6 years, or 24.8%. 
Much discrepancy also exists among women with respect to marital history (see 
Table 8 and Figure 12). According to an indirect estimate, the average number of years 
worked at mean age at retirement in 1985 was 29.5 years for single women, 26.5 years for 
divorced, 22.3 years for widowed and only 20.7 for married. Today, between ages 25 and 
50, approximatively 90% of the unmarried women are active as compared to about 50% of 
the married women. Under constant conditions, differences in work record between mari- 
tal statusea will continue to increase till 2000 and slowly decrease thereafter. By the year 
2050, differences in work record between single females and males would be reduced to 2.1 
years versus 10.8 years in 1985. 
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Table 7. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement, 1985-2050 (con- 
stant labor force participation rates - benchmark scenario). 
Males 40.3 39.4 37.8 36.8 36.6 
Females 22.6 23.9 26.2 27.6 27.9 
Table 8. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement. Women by marital 
status, 1985 and 2030 (constant labor force participation rates - benchmark scenario). 
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6. The Future of State Pensions 
6.1. Pension expenditures 
Estimated total State pension expenditures based on the use of the pension model 
amount to 218 billion Austrian Schillings for 1985 (see Table 9) while the observed figure 
was 181 billion Austrian Schillings, i.e. an overestimation of 20%. The difference evident- 
ly originated in the different simplifying assumptions used in the model, the most impor- 
tant ones being the fact that the model calculates entitlements on the basis of the number 
of years worked and not the number of years insured, and that benefits are not fully in- 
dexed for wage increase. In addition, it is not clear to which extent estimates for the fu- 
ture are also biased. 
Table 9. Percentage claiming for old-age pension, 1985-2050 (maximum cohort activity 
rate). 
Date at Which Mean Age a t  Retirement is Reached 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Males 97.9 96.8 92.1 91 -7 91.7 
Females 
single 79.4 90.6 92.1 91.7 91.7 
married 47.5 54.1 61.6 62.8 62.8 
divorced 74.7 90.6 92.1 91.7 91.7 
widowed 70.5 80.9 85.9 85.9 85.9 
Calculations for the four common demographic scenarios assumed constant work and 
retirement patterns. The national scenario, in addition to the demographic assumptions 
presented in the first section of this paper, assumed that labor force participation rates 
will increase to the level observed in the German Democratic Republic in 1970 over the 
period 1985-2005. This also implies an increase in the mean age at retirement for men 
from 59.8 to 62.4, the mean age at retirement for women remaining at 58.9. 
Analysis of Table 10 leads to clear conclusions (see also Figures 13 and 14). From 
1985 to 2000, a moderate rise in total pension expenditures is to be expected under any 
demographic scenario: between plus 5% for the whole period under the benchmark 
scenario and 8% under the mortality scenario. Under the national scenario, the rise is 
only 196, mostly because of the increase in age at retirement for males. A reason specific 
to Austria for the slow growth in total expenditures during this period is certainly the a b  
solute decrease in survivors expenditures: about 10% for the demographic scenarios and 
6% under the national scenario. 
Beyond 2000, a period of approximatively 30 years will follow which is characterized 
by a steady and sharp increase in old-age expenditures and little variation in survivors ex- 
penditures. Under the benchmark scenario, the average annual growth rate does not s u b  
stantially differ from the previous period - 0.7% between 2000 and 2015, 0.8% between 
2015 and 2030 versus 0.6% between 1985 and 2000 - and the difference arises from the 
stagnation of the survivors expenditures. Under the other scenarios, this difference is 
much more contrasted: 1.3% between 2000 and 2015 under the western scenario versus 
0.8% in the previous period - but a small decrease in survivors expenditures - 1.7% under 
both the mortality and the national scenario versus 0.2% and 0.9% respectively. During 
the second part of this period, 2015-2030, the growth is slightly lower under the western 
and mortality scenarios - 1.0% and 1.2% - while it continues at the same path under the 
national scenario because of additional pensions paid to older migrants. 
A straightforward consequence of the difference in trends in old-age and survivors 
expenditures is the decrease in the share of survivors expenditures in total pension expen- 
ditures: from about 21% as estimated in 1985 as opposed to 26% observed, to between 11 
and 15% in 2030, depending on the scenario. 
As compared with 1985, old-age expenditures in 2030 would be 37% higher under the 
benchmark, 61% under the western scenario, 69% under the national scenario, and 76% 
under the mortality scenario, and corresponding figures for total pension expenditures 
would be 28%, 45%, 55% and 57%. In other words, under mortality scenario results in a 
rise in pension expenditures over the period 1985-2030 which is twice that which would 
be observed under constant demographic conditions. It should also be pointed out that 
these calculations assumed that the sex differential in salary will remain constant in the 
future. Under the other extreme assumptions of no difference in salary, an approximate 
additional increase in old-age expenditures of about 15% to 25% would be observed in 
2030 depending on the time schedule of change. 
Beyond 2030, reversal trends are indicated: pension expenditures will decrease under 
any scenario. The decrease would be limited under the national scenario (average annual 
growth rate of -0.1% between 2030 and 2050), but marked under other scenarios: -0.6% 
per year for total expenditures under the mortality scenario, -0.8% under the western 
scenario and -1.0% under the benchmark scenario. 
6.2. Number of retiree8 
The tremendous increase in pension expenditures which will occur between 2000 and 
2030 is evidently and principally due to the fact that the large cohorts of the baby boom 
will go on retirement although changes in entitlements will also play a role - negative for 
males, strongly positive for females. 
Table 10. Pension expenditures, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Absolute (millions of Austrian Schillings) Index (1985=100) 
Benchmark old age 172698 188127 210255 236832 194687 109 122 137 113 
survivors 45147 41037 40927 41605 35095 9 1 91 92 78 
total 217845 229164 251182 278437 229782 105 115 128 105 
Mortality old age 198322 254315 303908 269670 115 147 176 156 
survivors 40781 38970 38789 35045 90 86 86 78 
total 239102 293284 342696 304715 110 135 157 140 
Western old age 195621 237806 277229 238854 113 138 161 138 
survivors 40610 40301 39427 31851 90 89 87 7 1 
total 236231 278107 316656 270705 108 128 145 124 
National 1 old age 178447 230037 292252 288999 103 133 169 167 
survivors 42519 44159 45284 43958 94 98 100 97 
total 220966 274196 337536 332957 101 126 155 153 
Percentage Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 1985/00 2000/15 2015/30 2030/50 
Benchmark old age 79.3 82.1 83.7 85.1 84.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 -1.0 
survivors 20.7 17.9 16.3 14.9 15.3 -0.6 -0.0 0.1 -0.9 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.3 0.6 0.7 -1.0 
Mortality old age 82.9 86.7 88.7 88.5 0.9 1.7 1.2 -0.6 
survivors 17.1 13.3 11.3 11.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.0 -0.5 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.6 1.4 1 .O -0.6 
Western old age 82.8 85.5 87.5 88.2 0.8 1.3 1 .O -0.7 
survivors 17.2 14.5 12.5 11.8 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.5 1.1 0.9 -0.8 
National 1 old age 80.8 83.9 86.6 86.8 0.2 1.7 1.6 -0.1 
survivors 19.2 16.1 13.4 13.2 -0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.1 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.1 1.4 1.4 -0.1 
Figure 13. 
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In the absence of information on the number of persons insured, the model used data 
on labor force participation. This provides correct estimates of total and per capita pen- 
sion expenditures but does not allow calculation of the number of beneficiaries. 
However, an attempt to  estimate of the number of retirees was made assuming that 
the proportion claiming for old-age pension is equal to  the maximum cohort activity rate. 
This assumption is definitively too restrictive, but nevertheless permits some insights in 
time trends. Table 9 shows the percentage claimings for old-age pension by sex and mari- 
tal status for women, among different cohorts reaching mean age at retirement, which 
were obtained under the assumption of constant activity rates. While 98% of the males 
claimed for old-age benefits in 1985, they would only comprise 92% in 2015. On the con- 
trary, the percentage claimants among single and divorced women would increase from 
respectively 75% and 79% to 92% - same as for men - from 70% to 86% for widows and 
from 47% to 63% for married women. Whether the proportion claimants among males 
will decrease or not is a hazardous question. On the other hand, one can probably con- 
clude that around 2015, the proportion claimants among males, single, divorced and pos- 
sibly widowed women will be similar but will remain much lower among married women. 
Table 11 and Figures 15a, 15b and 16 show results from calculations for both old-age 
retirees and survivors. Between 1985 and 2000, a similar increase of about 
80,000/100,000 new retirees is indicated for each sex and under both scenarios. However, 
an exception is the national scenario for males, under which the number of male retirees 
indicates a small decrease as result of the increase in age a t  retirement. 
Between 2000 and 2030, a stronger and steadier increase is observed except for males 
under the benchmark scenario - same linear trend from 1985 to 2030 - and under the na- 
tional scenario - acceleration after 2015 due the retirement of migrants. The strongest in- 
crease is observed for females under the national scenario and corresponds to an increase 
in the number of married women on retirement. Indeed, besides a marked increase in the 
participation of women in the labor force, the national scenario also assumes that there 
are marital status differentials in activity levels which will completely disappear beyond 
2005. Consequently the proportion of claimants among married women would be the same 
as among unmarried. The strongest increase for males is evidently observed under the 
mortality scenario: 2.8 times the increase observed under the benchmark scenario between 
2000 and 2030. 
Beyond 2030, much smaller cohorts will retire and the total number of old-age re- 
tirees will decrease. An exception is the national scenario under which migration would 
result in a stabilization of the number of male retirees till 2050. 
Regarding the number of survivors, a decrease of about 30,000/60,000, namely 7% to 
15%, and dependent on scenarios is to be expected between 1985 and 2015, compared with 
an estimated total of 414,000 in 1985. It is followed between 2015 and 2030 by a slight 
increase: maximum 21,000 under the national scenario, or a stagnation under the western 
scenario. Beyond 2030, a sharp decrease will occur, especially under the benchmark and 
western scenarios, of less than about 60,000 between 2030 and 2050. 
6.3. Labor force 
Within a pay-as-you-go system, the increase in pension expenditures is not a prob- 
lem per se but rather should be considered in relation to variation in the labor force. Ac- 
cording to  figurea in Table 12, the size of the labor force would remain approximatively 
constant between 1985 and 2000 - a 1% increase for the whole period - in the absence of 
external migration and aasuming constant activity rates. Mortality improvement as as- 
sumed under the western and mortality scenario would give a 1% increase in the number 
of active. An additional 1% increase would result from the adoption of the Swedish pat- 
tern of nuptiality - western scenario - because s greater proportion of women would be 
unmarried and consequently active. From 2000 to 2015, a decrease of between 170,000 to 
Table 11. Number of retirees, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 
Old-Age Retirees 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
Mortality males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
National 1 males 
females 
total 
Survivors 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
Mortality males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
National 1 males 
females 
total 
Figure 15a. old -age re t i rees  
males 
1.3 1 
Benchmark + Mortality 0 Western A National I 
Figure 15b. old -age re t i rees  
females 
1.3 
Benchmark + Mortality 0 Western A National I 
Figure 16. Survivors  
W Benchmark + Mortality 0 Western A National 1 
230,000, namely 5% to 7% will be experienced. Starting in 2015, the fertility scenario 
diverges from the other demographic scenarios. The size of the labor force would level off 
a t  2.9 million at around 2030 as opposed to 3.3 million in 1985, if fertility would return to 
replacement level by the year 2005. On the contrary, a steeper fall is indicated under the 
benchmark, mortality and western scenarios: about 2.6 million actives under all three 
scenarios in 2030 and respectively 2.1, 2.2 and 1.9 million in 2050 versus 3.3 million in 
1985. This clearly illustrates the fact that any further drop in fertility will not have sub- 
stantial effects on the labor force before 2040. 
On the other hand, the assumption of a constant inflow of migrants together with an 
increase of the participation in the labor force, especially for women, would have a 
tremendous impact on the number of active as illustrated by Figure 17. The labor force 
would already reach 4.2 million in 2000 and a maximum of 4.5 million in 2015. Beyond 
this date, the inflow of migrants does not compensate for the depletion caused by the re- 
tirement of the large cohorts of baby boomers, and the labor would decrease to 4.2 million 
in 2030 and 3.8 million in 2050. 
Another main characteristic of future changes in the labor force is its aging after 
2015. Evidence of aging can be found in Table 13 which gives the overall activity for 
males and females. Except for the national scenario, all other scenarios assume constant 
age-specific activity rates. In 1985, the overall activity rate was 67.7 for males and 42.0 
for females. Under the four common scenarios, little variation is observed till 2015. In 
2030, the following values are obtained for males: 60.2 under the fertility scenario, 58.8 
under the benchmark scenario, 55.2 under the western scenario, and 53.4 under the mor- 
Table 12. Size of the labor force, 1985-2030 (constant activity rates). 
Scenario 1985 
Absolute (1000s) 
Benchmark males 1954 
females 1386 
total 3340 
Fertility males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
Mortality males 
females 
total 
National 1 males 
females 
total 
Index 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
Fertility males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
Mortality males 
females 
total 
National 1 males 
females 
total 
Figure 17. Labour force  
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Table 13. Overall activity rate, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 
Males 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Females 
tality scenario. Corresponding figures for females are 39.2, 37.3, 37.5 and 35.2. Between 
2030 and 2050, an additional decrease of about 213 percentage points is observed under 
the benchmark, mortality and western scenarios, while a symmetrical increase is observed 
under the fertility scenario. 
Before going on retirement, the large cohorts of baby boomers p w  by ages a t  which 
activity rates are fairly low while cohorts at  ages of maximum activity are much smaller. 
Results from the national scenario however show that a constant inflow of migrants to- 
gether with a limited increase in the level of activity can offset to a great extent the aging 
of the labor force. Under this scenario, the overall activity rate rises to 78.4 and 54.5 in 
2000 respectively for males and females. Between 2000 and 2015, it remains constant, de- 
creases by about 5 percentage points till 2030, and then stabilizes again. 
6.4. T h e  ra t io  contribution/benefite 
The impact of future changes in pension expenditures, relative to variations in the 
labor force, on the financial equilibrium of the system pension is reflected in the ratio 
contribution/benefits (see Table 14 and Figure 18). In 1985, the pension model gives a 
value of 0.71 for this ratio, corresponding to a markedly underfunded scheme. However, 
as already mentioned, assumptions used by the model lead to overestimation of pension 
expenditures by about 20% in 1985. Therefore, the value of this ratio for 1985 is to be in- 
terpreted with caution, and rather changes in the ratio over time will be considered. 
Under the benchmark, mortality and western scenarios, the ratio continuously 
deteriorates over the period 1985-2050. The decrease is first smooth between 1985 and 
2000 as little change is observed in both the labor force and the number of retirees. It ac- 
celerates between 2000 and 2015, and is even more accentuated between 2015 and 2030. 
Beyond this date, the decrease continues but is very limited. Values for 2050 are respec- 
tively 0.42, 0.33 and 0.32 for the benchmark, mortality and western scenarios. One can 
note that the strong improvement in mortality, especially for males, as assumed in the 
mortality scenario, and a smoother improvement combined with a further drop in the 
TFR to 1.28 would have similar impacts on the pension system. In both cases, the 
deterioration in the ratio is extremely strong: it is divided by more than 2. 
Under the fertility scenario, the pattern of changes is similar till 2030 although the 
fall is slightly lower. In 2030, the ratio contribution/benefit would be 0.49, which is only 
6 percentage points above the benchmark. Beyond this date an improvement is indicated 
to 0.58. An increase in fertility would thus have limited impact prior to  2030. 
Under the national scenario, a strong improvement in the ratio would be experienced 
till 2000 - to 0.89 - and will be followed by a deterioration between 2000 and 2030. 
Between 2000 and 2015 the deterioration is similar to the one observed under the other 
scenarios while between 2015 and 2030, it is obviously much stronger, even if the ratio 
remains higher - 0.57. Beyond 2030, a small decrease of minus 4 percentage points is in- 
dicated. Some calculations wuming no migration indicate better results - 0.62 in 2030 - 
and show that no benefits would result for the pension system from migration. On the 
contrary, it would slightly add to the deterioration, as aasumed under the national 
scenario. Indeed, this conclusion depends very much on the level of migration assumed as 
well as on the age pattern of the migrants. In any case, given the age structure of the 
Austrian population and the level of fertility, migration seems to have limited possible 
impact. 
Table 14. Ratio contribution/benefits. 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 0.71 0.69 0.58 0.43 0.42 
Fertility 0.69 0.60 0.49 0.58 
Mortality 0.66 0.51 0.36 0.33 
Western 0.67 0.54 0.38 0.32 
National 1 0.89 0.76 0.57 0.53 
Figure 18. Ratio contribution/benefits 
Benchmark + Fertility 0 Mortality 4 Western x National 1 
6.5. Cut t ing  benefits versus  increasing contr ibut ion 
Within the framework of a pay-as-you-go system, financial equilibrium can be 
reached by either cutting benefits or increasing contribution. Table 15 shows cuts in 
benefits and contribution rate corresponding to  a balanced pension fund over the period 
1985-2030 (see also Figure 19). 
In 2000, cuts in average benefits would be limited to  3% under the benchmark and 
fertility scenarios, and 6% and 7% under the western and mortality scenarios as compared 
with 1985, while they could be increased by 25% under the national scenario. In 2015 
cuts would range from 15% under the fertility scenario to  28% under the western scenario, 
while still a rise of 7% would be possible under the national scenario. In 2030, cuts would 
be necessary under any scenario and, except under the national scenario - minus 20% - 
would reach dramatic levels - minus 31% to minus 49%. In 2050, the situation would im- 
prove under the fertility scenario - minus "only" 18% - but continue to  deteriorate in the 
other cases: minus 25% under the national scenario and with a maximum of 54/55% 
under the mortality and western scenarios. 
The balanced contribution rate for 1985 as estimated by the model is 31.9%, while 
the actual rate is 22.7%. Again due to the overestimation of pension expenditures in 
1985, this figure does not allow a strict interpretation but rather permits assessment of 
changes over time. Logically, variations in the contribution rate are symmetric to 
changes in average benefits and only maximum values desire to be commented. In 2030, 
in order to have the pension fund balanced, it would be necessary to  set the contribution 
rate equal to 40% of the gross salary under the national scenario, 47% under the fertility 
scenario, 52% under the benchmark scenario, and about 60163% under the western and 
mortality scenarios. And in 2050, figures are worse for the last three scenarios. 
If we consider the most critical period, namely around 2030, two conclusions arise 
from these calculations. First, the "best" situation is, by far, observed under the national 
scenario. However, this situation corresponds to a marked deterioration in the perfor- 
mance of the pension system - a cut of 20% in benefits or an increase of 10 points in the 
contribution rate. Second, all other "pure" demographic scenarios result in a similar level 
of deterioration - 50% cuts in benefits or contributions higher than 60% of gross salary - 
which cannot be solved, under constant work and retirement conditions, by either cutting 
benefits or increasing contribution. 
Table 15. Cuts in benefits and contribution rate corresponding to a balanced pension 
fund, 1985-2030. 
Scenario 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
Cuts in Benefitsa) (percentage) 
Balanced Contribution  ate^) 
a) As compared with 1985 
b) Actual rate 22.7% 
Figurel9. Percentage changes in average benefits 
(constant contribution rate) 
30 I I .  
Benchmark Fertility Mortality a Western 0 National 1 
7. Impact  of Selected Policy Measures 
7.1. Increasing t h e  participation in t he  labor force and age a t  retirement 
The so-called "GDR" scenario assumes that by the year 2005, both males and fe- 
males would follow the pattern of labor force participation observed in 1985 in the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, which is characterized by a high participation of women and 
no difference between marital statuses. The "65" scenario assumed that age at retire- 
ment is progressively raised to 65 years by the year 2005 for both males and females and 
that no survivor pensions are served under age 6 0 . ~  Impacts of both scenarios on the size 
of the labor force, the number of retirees and the average number of years worked under 
constant demographic conditions are presented in Tables 16, 17 and 18. 
Table 16. Lncreasing participation in the labor force and age at retirement. Impact on 
the size of the labor force, 1985-2050 - benchmark scenario. 
Scenario 
Benchmark females 
males 
total 
"GDR" 
"65" 
females 
males 
total 
females 
males 
total 
"GDR" females 
males 
total 
6665" females 
males 
total 
Size of the Labor Force 
Absolute Difference with Benchmark 
1985-00 2000-15 2015-30 2030-50 
Relative Difference (%) 
As expected the "GDR" scenario would lead to a strong immediate increase in the 
number of actives especially among females. By the year 2000, the difference with the 
benchmark scenario is plus 829,000, of which 507,000 are women. More important, 
perhaps, is the fact that a rise of 516 years in the age of retirement would result in a sub- 
stantial increase in the size of the labor force which represents almost half - 393,000 - of 
' ~ c t i v i t ~  rater for the age groupr 55-59 and 60-64 were also asrumed to have an upward rhift. 
Table 17. Increasing participation in the labor force and age at retirement. Impact on 
the number of retirees, 1985-2050 - benchmark scenario. 
Scenario 
Benchmark Females 
males 
total 
"GDR" 
"65" 
females 
males 
total 
females 
males 
total 
"GDR" females 
males 
total 
females 
males 
total 
Number of Retirees (1000s) 
Absolute Changes (1000s) 
Relative Changes (%) 
Table 18. Increasing participation in the labor force and age at retirement. Impact on 
the average number of years worked, 1985-2050 - benchmark scenario. 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark males 40.3 39.4 37.8 36.8 36.6 
females 22.6 23.9 26.2 27.6 27.9 
"GDR" males 
females 
"65" males 
females 
the total increase under the "GDR" scenario. By the year 2030, the bonus for the active 
population would amount to  28% under the "GDR" scenario and 18% under the "65" 
scenario. 
Because it increases activity level, the "GDR" scenario would result in an increase 
in the number of retirees, especially female retirees: plus about 15% - 20% for females, 
less than 10% for males in the long run - compared with the benchmark. On the con- 
trary, the number of retirees would approximatively drop by one-third under the "65" 
scenario. 
Both scenarios also result in an increase in the work record of the retirees and conse- 
quently in an increase in entitlements. The increase is immediate and tremendous for 
women under the "GDR" scenario because of the dramatic rise in the participation in the 
labor force of the married women: from 22.6 years in 1985 to  33.5 years in 2000 versus 
23.9 years under the benchmark scenario. In the short term, this seems to  be an artifact 
but in the longer term, differences in entitlements would become real: 34.7 years versus 
30.6 years under the "65" scenario and 25.6 years under the benchmark in 2030. The in- 
crease is more limited for males with a maximum of 42.0 years in 2015 for the "GDR" 
scenario and 42.8 years in 2030 for the "65" scenario, but contrasts with the decrease 
which would be observed under the benchmark scenario of 36.8 years in 2030. 
The combined influence of changes in both the number of retirees and work records 
on total expenditures is summarized in Table 19. Under the "GDR" scenario, total expen- 
ditures would increase by 12/14% in comparison with the benchmark scenario - mostly 
due to  the increase in benefits for women - while under the "65" scenario, the total 
benefits would be lower than under the benchmark scenario by between 29% in 2000 to  
20% in 2050. 
Table 20 shows the overall impact of both scenarios on the ratio 
contribution/benefits. The bonus from the "GDR" scenario as compared with the bench- 
mark scenario turns out t o  be small and represents only 3/4 percentage points - 0.48 
versus 0.43 in 2030. On the contrary, the "65" scenario brings about a strong improve- 
ment in the ratio contributions/benefits. In 2000, the scheme would be overfunded - ratio 
1.08 - and the ratio would remain above its 1985 level till about 2020, and in 2030 would 
be lower by only 6 percentage points under the 1985 level. Alternatively, this corresponds 
t o  a 10% cut in benefits. In other words, under constant demographic conditions, raising 
age at  retirement to  age 65 would to  a great extent solve the pension problem. 
7.2. Contr ibu tory  versus pay-as-you-go systems 
Under the worse conditions for the pension system, namely the mortality scenario, a 
contribution rate of 65.3% would be necessary to  balance the fund in 2030. Would a com- 
plementary contributory-based pension scheme perform better in Austria? Such a scheme 
is advantageous if the insurance premium is less than the corresponding increase in contri- 
bution under the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. Calculations have been carried out 
under two options: a) the scheme is run on a non-profitable basis and the whole principal 
and interests go to  the insured; b) the scheme is run on a profitable basis by an insurance 
company which only refunds half of the principal. Both options were tested for three lev- 
els of real interest rate: 1%, 2% and 3% and assuming every active starts savings for pen- 
sions in 1990. 
Balanced contribution rates under both the pure PAYG and the mixed systems for 
the year 2030 are presented in Table 21 for each eex and marital statue for women. 
Under a contributory-based system, differences in contribution arise from differences in 
the number of years worked and thus in the principle saved. 
Table 19. Increasing participation in the labor force and age at retirement. Impact on to- 
tal benefits, 1985-2050 - benchmark scenario. 
Scenario 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
"GDR" males 
females 
total 
"65" males 
females 
total 
"GDR" males 
females 
total 
6665" males 
females 
total 
Total Benefits (millions of schillings) 
Absolute Changes 
Relative Changes (%) 
Table 20. Increasing participation in the labor force and age a t  retirement. Impact on 
the ratio contribution/benefits, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 0.71 0.69 0.58 0.43 0.42 
"GDR" 0.73 0.63 0.48 0.47 
"65" 1.08 0.88 0.65 0.62 
Table 21. Contribution rates corresponding to fully-funded pension schemes in 2030. 
Sex/ Pure Pay-as-You-Go 
Marital Pay-as-You-Go + 
Status System Complementary Private Insurance Difference 
Share of the Rate of Interest 
Principal 
Returned 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3% 
Males all 
half 
Females 
Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
all 
half 
all 
half 
all 
half 
all 
half 
A first conclusion is that in 2030, the mixed system performs better than the PAYG 
system for both sexes and marital statuses. However, calculations for other years show 
that it only perform better for both sexes and marital statuses starting in the 2020s with 
a rate of interest of 3%, and in the 2030s with a rate of interest of 1%. Prior to this date 
retirees would get more from the existing PAYG system. 
A second conclusion is that contribution rates are still very high under the mixed- 
system: 39% for males and between 37% and 44% for females, if the scheme is non- 
profitable and with a 1% interest rate. With a real rate of interest of 3%, all contribution 
rates are between 31% and 36%. If the scheme is profitable, it requires contribution rates 
between 47% and 58% at  1%, and between 34% and 40% a t  3%. Therefore, a mixed sys- 
tem including a complementary contributory-based pension scheme would not provide 
any real solution to  the pension problem in Austria. 
8. Conclueion 
The use of dynamic projections of the population by marital status combined with 
the scenario method brings new insights to future aging of the Austrian population as well 
as depicting the consequences for the State pension system. Despite existing uncertainty 
regarding future demographic trends, it shows that clear conclusions can be reached. 
The aging of the Austrian population is certain. Neither an increase in fertility nor 
an inflow of migrants could offset the reshaping of the age pyramid due to the large 
cohorts of baby boomers. Under constant demographic conditions, the OADR would be 
35.6 in 2030 versus 21.2 in 1985. If fertility would return to replacement level in the short 
term, the OADR would only be lowered by 3.6 percentage points in 2030. The same limit- 
ed impact is observed for migration which, under the national scenario, adds to aging and 
plays a negative role. In both cases, substantial impacts would require extreme and un- 
realistic values. Consequently, the amount of aging mostly depends on the future of mor- 
tality. The low mortality scenario indicates upward differences of 35% in the size of the 
elderly population, and about 10 percentage points in the OADR by the year 2030. But 
no one can tell if this is an upper limit. On the contrary, the time path of aging is well 
ascertained: maximum aging will occur between 2015 and 2030 and will slow down con- 
siderably thereafter. Also, it is certain that aging will be accompanied by substantial 
changes in the marital composition of the elderly. The proportion single and divorced will 
markedly increase, even under constant nuptiality, and reach 22-25% for both males and 
females aged 60 and over. At the same time, the proportion males married will strongly 
decrease from more than 75% in 1985 to about 60% under constant nuptiality, while the 
proportion widowed will remain approximatively constant. On the contrary, the propor- 
tion female widows will decrease from about 50% to 30%-40% depending on future male 
mortality. Corollarily, slightly more aged women will be married than at  present - 35%. 
Parallel to  aging and due to  recent changes in the working behavior, average work 
records will decrease for males from about 40 years in 1985 to  about 37 years around 2030 
assuming constant participation in the labor force, and strongly increase for females from 
about 23 to 28 years. As a consequence, every other thing being constant, average 
benefits will decrease by about 10% for males and increase by more than 20% for females. 
In addition, a greater proportion of women will claim for old-age benefits. However, little 
variation is to  be expected in the strong discrepancies in entitlements observed at  present 
between unmarried and married women if working behaviors remain unchanged. 
Whether expressed in terms of cuts in average benefits or raises in contribution 
rates, the overall impact of socio-demographic changes on the performance of the State 
pension system looks dramatic. In order to balance the pension fund, assuming constant 
working and retirement behaviors, it would be necessary in 2030 to  decrease average 
benefits by about 50% or, equivalently, the balance contribution rate would amount t o  
60% of the gross salary. 
Simulations of different "policy measures" lead to strongly contrasted findings. 
First, an alternative contributory-based supplementary pension scheme would not bring 
any real solution, and would generate much discrepancy among women. Second, a rising 
level of activity, especially for women, would have limited impact: it certainly improves 
the contributions, but in the long run it leads to a tremendous rise in entitlements. 
Third, an increase in the mean age at  retirement to  about 65 years is by far the most 
efficient "solution" in the case of Austria. Under constant demographic conditions, it al- 
most completely solves the pension problem. Indeed, it is certainly the combination of in- 
creasing age at  retirement and participation in the labor force, as illustrated by the na- 
tional scenario, which would give the best results. However, it should be pointed out that 
this disregards whether a policy aimed at  increasing age a t  retirement has some economic 
rationale, and if a positive behavioral response can be expected from the mass of workers. 
